The existence of sunspot equilibria raises the question of whether it is plausible that agents will actually coordinate on them. One natural criterion for this is that the sunspot equilibria should be stable under adaptive learning.
2
Although it has been shown by (Woodford 1990 ) that stable sunspots can exist in simple overlapping generations models, 3 the sunspots in many calibrated applied models are lacking this necessary stability. For example (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) show that sunspots in the Farmer-Guo model are unstable, and (Evans and McGough 2002a) describe a stability puzzle surrounding the lack of stable indeterminacies in a host of non-convex RBCtype models.
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The existence of indeterminacies in monetary models, together with the instability of indeterminacies in RBC-type models, raises a natural question: Are sunspot equilibria in the New Keynesian models stable under learning? This specific question has been addressed by (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) , who consider a purely forward looking AS equation (" Phillips" curve) and analyze a variety of interest rules including those dependent on current, lagged, and expected inflation and output gap, and those also dependent on an interest rate smoothing term. They find that if the interest rate depends only on expected inflation and expected output gap then there can exist stable equilibria that depend on finite state sunspots; otherwise, the sunspot equilibria they consider are not learnable.
5
Independent of the monetary policy literature, work on multiple equilibria and stability in macroeconomic models has continued, and recent research has emphasized that stability under learning of sunspots can depend upon the way in which a particular equilibrium is viewed, or represented. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003c) e  s  e  m  o  d  e  l  s  s  t  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  u  n  d  e  r  l  e  a  r  n  i  n  g  o  f  "  f  u  n  d  a  m  e  n  t  a  l  "  (  m  i  n  i  m  a  l  s  t  a  t  e  v  a  r  i  a  b  l  e  )  s  o  l  u  t  i  o  n  s  h  a  s  b  e  e  n  s  t  u  d  i  e  d  b  y  (  B  u  l  l  a  r  d  a  n  d  M  i  t  r  a  2  0  0  3  )  ,  (  E  v  a  n  s  a  n  d  H  o  n  k  a  p  o  h  j  a  2  0  0  3  d  )  a  n  d  o  t  h  e  r  s  .  F  o  r  a  s  u  r  v  e  y  w  i  t  h  r  e  f  e  r  e  n  c  e  s  s  e  e  (  E  v  a  n  s  a  n  d  H  o  n  k  a  p  o  h  j  a  2  0  0  3  a  )  .  A  n  i  m  p  o  r  t  a  n  t  e  a  r  l  y  i  n  s  t  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  r  e  s  u  l  t  w  a  s  o  b  t  a  i  n  e  d  b  y  (  H  o  w  i  t  t  1  9  9 2 ) .
that no stable sunspots exist in these models. The apparent paradox is resolved as follows: all sunspot equilibria in these models can be represented as a linear dependence on lagged endogenous variables and a sunspot variable taking the form of a martingale difference sequence. These representations are always unstable under learning. However, when the sunspot is a finite state Markov process, the associated equilibrium is also finite state and thus has an alternate representation depending solely on the sunspot. When represented in this manner, the associated learning dynamics indicate stability for some (but not all) regions of the parameter space. In (Evans and McGough 2003) , we studied sunspot equilibria in a univariate stochastic linear forward looking model that incorporates a lag. We found that any given equilibrium may be viewed, or represented, in two fundamentally different ways: in the usual way, as a linear dependence on once and twice lagged endogenous variables and on a sunspot having zero conditional mean; and in a new way, on once lagged endogenous variables and on a sunspot exhibiting serial correlation. We referred to the usual way of viewing sunspots as the "general form" representation of the equilibrium, and to the new way of viewing sunspots as the "common factor" representation of the equilibrium.
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We found that the stability of the equilibrium in question depended on the chosen representation. In particular, for the model we considered, stable common factor sunspots were found to exist in abundance, even though, as was already well known, there exist no stable general form sunspots.
This new line of research indicates the need for careful analysis of sunspot stability in applied models. Every sunspot equilibrium has a common factor representation, and the stability properties of common factor representations are different from their general form counterparts. Thus, stability analysis must incorporate both general form and common factor representations. In this paper, we generalize common factor analysis to apply to standard models of monetary policy, and carefully investigate the stability of the resulting representations. We follow (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) by specifying a simple New Keynesian IS-AS model, except that, for added generality, as in (Galí and Gertler 1999) and much applied work, we s  w  i  t  h  r  e  a  l  r  o  o  t  s  ,  b  u  t  w  e  s  h  o  w  e  l  s  e  w  h  e  r  e  t  h  a  t  c  o  o  m  o  n  f  a  c  t  o  r  s  u  n  s  p  o  t  s  r  e  p  r  e  s  e  n  t  a  t  i  o  n  s  e  x  i  s  t  m  o  r  e  g  e  n  e  r  a  l  l  y  w  h  e  n  t  h  e  r  e  a  r  e  c  o  m  p  l  e  x  r  o  o  t  s  . allow for some dependence on lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. We close the model with a variety of interest rate rules: like Bullard and Mitra, we consider rules depending on current, lagged, and expected inflation; and like Honkapohja and Mitra, we also consider rules depending on lagged nominal interest rates. For each model we consider three calibrations of the IS-AS structure, as well as some alternative parameter values. Analytic results are, in general, unavailable, and so we test stability numerically by considering, for each calibration, a lattice over the space of policy parameters. At each point in the lattice, indeterminacy and stability of the corresponding equilibria are examined. Our main result supports the findings and advice of Honkapohja and Mitra, and indeed it makes their cautionary note more urgent: All models in which the policy rule depends on some form of expectations of future variables exhibit stable common factor sunspots for some parameter values. To be sure, these parameter values are not always reasonable, but, in some cases, they closely match calibrations. Furthermore, these stable sunspots exist even when the policy rule also depends on other aggregates, such as current inflation or output, and lagged interest rate. We also find that no general form sunspots are stable, thus emphasizing the importance of analyzing common factor representations. This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the various monetary models under consideration, as well as the associated learning theory and the extension of common factor analysis to monetary models. To conserve space and facilitate comprehension, we include explicit computations of equilibrium representations in the Appendix and for only one policy rule, and simply note that the remaining policy rules can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Section three contains the results of our investigations. The policy rules are classified into four types and discussed in separate subsections. In each case we consider numerous permutations of calibration, Phillips curve structure, indeterminacy nature, and representation type, and thus a careful catalog of all possible results would be tedious if not infeasible. Therefore, we provide a summary of the main features followed by a more careful discussion of the particularly interesting results. Section four concludes.
Theory
In this section we develop the theory necessary to analyze the stability of sunspot equilibria. We begin by specifying the models of interest. Then, for expedience, we choose a particular specification and develop the associated equilibrium representations and learning analysis. It is straightforward to modify this developed theory for application to other model specifications, and thus we omit the details concerning these other models. We initially develop the theory under the rational expectations assumption. Then, beginning in Section 2.4, we relax this assumption and study the stability of the solutions under adaptive learning.
Monetary Models and Policy Rules
We explore the possibility of existence of stable sunspots using several variants of the New Keynesian Monetary model. All specifications have in common the following forward looking IS-AS curves:
Here x t is the proportional output gap, π t is the inflation rate, and g t and u t are independent, exogenous, stationary, zero mean AR(1) shocks with damping parameters 0 ≤ ρ g < 1 and 0 ≤ ρ u < 1 respectively. Equation (1) is the "IS" relationship obtained by log-linearizing the Euler equation for consumer optimization and using the GDP identity. This yields a unit coefficient on E t x t + 1
.
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When γ = 1, equation (2) is the pure forwardlooking New Keynesian "AS" relationship based on "Calvo pricing," and employed in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) and Ch. 3 of (Woodford 2003).
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Here 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Again, this equation is obtained as the linearization around a steady state. The specification of the AS curve in the case 0 < γ < 1 incorporates an inertial term and is similar in spirit to (Fuhrer and Moore 1995) , the Section 4 model of (Galí and Gertler 1999) , and the Ch. 3, Section 3.2 model of (Woodford 2003), each of which allows for some backward looking elements. Models with 0 < γ < 1 are often called "hybrid" models, and we remark that in some versions, such as (Fuhrer and Moore 1995), β = 1, so that the sum of forward and backward looking components sum to one, while in other versions β < 1 is possible.
The region and nature of a model's indeterminacy depends critically on the specification of the policy rule. specification, we analyze a number of policy rules, which we parameterize as follows: Finally, PR 4 is the rule examined in the theoretical part of (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) , and is the simplest form of the empirical interest rate rules that they estimate. A parameter value 0 < θ < 1 corresponds to inertia in interest rate setting, with policymakers responding gradually to changes in information. 
Determinacy

3
. Combining the policy rule (3) or (6) with (1) and (2) leads to the first-order reduced form
The specific form of F, H are given in the Appendix for PR 
for suitable M, N. Here we are using the fact that F is invertible. Note that by virtue of the rational expectations assumption ε t is a martingale difference sequence, i.e. a stochastic process such that E
there is no guarantee that a given mds ε t yields a nonexplosive solution; it is precisely this issue that is addressed by the nature of the indeterminacy.
To understand for which mds ε t the model is nonexplosive, we assume that F 
H are all real then the columns of S are the corresponding linearly independent eigenvectors. If two eigenvalues are complex then we assume that the matrix of eigenvectors, S and the matrix of eigenvalues Λ are altered to allow for a matrix factorization with real entries. This can be achieved via the following observation: If A is a real 2 × 2 matrix with complex eigenvalues µ ± iν and complex eigenvectors u ± iv then
where the columns of S are v and u. If A is n × n then it can be decomposed similarly as SDS
with D a block diagonal matrix with the real eigenvalues and 2 × 2 blocks corresponding to the complex eigenvalues on its diagonal. Also, here and throughout the paper, the eigenvalues in Λ are assumed ordered in decreasing magnitude. = 0 for i = 1, 2; that is, the dimension of the unstable manifold, which in this simple linear framework is the direct sum of the eigenspaces corresponding to the explosive eigenvalues, is two, and there is a unique mds ε Thus there is a one dimensional continuum of equilibria, and, consequently, we say the model exhibits order one indeterminacy. Finally, if λ i is in the unit circle for all i, the process y t is nonexplosive regardless of the mds ε t . There is a two dimensional continuum of equilibria, and we say the model exhibits order two indeterminacy.
We have focused on cases of determinacy and indeterminacy, but one other possibility should be noted. If |λ 3 | > 1, so that there are three roots outside the unit circle, then the model is explosive: there exist no nonexplosive solutions and with probability one at least one of the components of y t tends to infinity in absolute value as t → ∞.
Representations
A rational expectations equilibrium representation (REER) is a discrete difference equation, any solution to which is an REE. As is now well known, see e.g. Chapters 8 and 9 of (Evans and 
where for convenience, we writeĝ
) . Here and in the sequel, S i j
Thus, in the determinate case, the unique nonexplosive solution takes the form y t = a + by
where a = 0 because in the structural equations we have omitted intercepts. We include the intercept term a here and below because under learning agents will be assumed to estimate its value.
Order One Indeterminacy.
Order one indeterminacy occurs when |λ 1 | > 1 and the remaining eigenvalues have norm less than one. Notice this implies λ 1 is real; however λ i for i > 1 may be complex. For reasons discussed below, in the indeterminate case, we only consider real eigenvalues. To obtain a nonexplosive solution, we require that z 1 t = 0. We now proceed to develop the general form and common factor representations.
General Form Representations: As is shown in the Appendix, imposing the restriction z 1 t = 0 for all t leads to General Form (GF) representations (13) for either i = 2 or i = 3. However, we now rewrite (13) as
We interpret the noise term on the right to be a sunspot ζ t and thus write z 
restriction z 1 t = 0 and using the definition of z t yields a CF representation of the form y t = a + by
and a = 0. Again there are two CF representations of this form. Note that in these representations, the endogenous variables depend on one lag, current intrinsic noise, and a serially correlated sunspot. For reasons that are now apparent, complex eigenvalues pose difficulties for common factor representations; if λ i is complex, it is not possible to write the sunspot ζ t as a serially correlated process with real damping parameter. This problem is not insurmountable -in fact we consider it in another paper -however, we feel it is best avoided for now, as our story is well told by focusing on the real case.
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Therefore, throughout the paper, our analysis in the indeterminate region pertains to representations obtained via real eigenvalues.
Order Two Indeterminacy
General Form Representations: Now all eigenvalues are in the unit circle and thus there is no concern over the nonexplosiveness restriction. Pick real eigenvalues λ i , and λ j , where i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j. Combining the two equations (13) for i and j with the definition of z t we obtain three representations of the form (12) except that now ξ t is an arbitrary twodimensional mds. See the Appendix for details on the required (b, h, c, d).
Common Factor Representations: Combining the two i = j equations from (13) and defining the VAR sunspot we obtain CF representations of the form (14) except that now of course ζ t is two-dimensional. Again, further details on (b, c) are given in the Appendix.
Discussion
For PR 1 and PR 3 with γ = 1 the procedure to provide solution representations could be simplified since π We also provide a brief discussion of REERs under policy rules PR 2 and PR
4
. In the case of PR 2 , given by (5), the state variable in the first-order form must be enlarged to include x , given by (7), the state vector is written asŷ
. However, the procedure for determining REERs remains analogous.
We close this section with a brief remark on an aspect of the time series properties of sunspot equilibria. Consider the CF representations (14) . If the exogenous sunspot variable ζ t is independent of the intrinsic shocksĝ t , then it is easily verified that the endogenous variables y t have larger variances than are present in the corresponding minimal state variable solution y . Policy makers that aim to minimize output and inflation volatility would thus want to avoid interest rate rules consistent with the existence of CF sunspot solutions, at least if these solutions are stable under learning. We now turn to this issue, i.e. to the question of the stability of the various solutions under least squares learning.
Learning
We use expectational stability as our criterion for judging whether agents may be able to coordinate on specific solutions, including in particular sunspot equilibria. This is because, for a wide range of models and solutions, Estability has been shown to govern the local stability of rational expectations equilibria under least squares learning. In many cases this correspondence can be proved, and in cases where this cannot be formally demonstrated the "E-stability principle" has been validated through simulations. Before giving details, we provide an overview of E-stability; for further reading see (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) .
The models analyzed in this paper can be written in reduced form as follows:
We now write E * t y t + 1
to indicate that we no longer impose rational expectations, and at issue is how agents form their time t expectations E * t . Backing away from the benchmark that agents are fully rational, we assume that agents believe the endogenous variable y t depends linearly on lagged endogenous variables, current (and possibly lagged) exogenous shocksĝ t , and exogenous sunspots. The latter will either be serially uncorrelated or have an AR(1) structure. Combining these regressors into the vector X Under real-time learning agents will estimate Θ using an algorithm such as recursive least squares and these estimates will be updated over time. Given a particular value for Θ the corresponding expectations E * t y t + 1
can be computed, the expectations can be substituted in the reduced form equation above, and the true data generating process, or actual law of motion (ALM), thus determined. If the perceived law of motion is well specified then the actual law of motion will have the same form:
In particular, the ALM will depend linearly on the same variables as did the PLM. Thus a map, known as the T-map, is constructed, taking the perceived parameters to the implied parameters. A fixed point of this map constitutes a representation of a rational expectations equilibrium.
We note that associated with a given reduced form model there may be multiple well-specified PLMs, and the specification of the PLM determines the representation of the REE that agents are trying to learn. For example, it is reasonable for X t to include a constant, once lagged y, currentĝ, and the serially correlated sunspot ζ; in this case agents would be trying to learn a common factor representation. It is also reasonable for X t to include a constant, once and twice lagged y, current and once laggedĝ, and a mds noise term ξ; in this case agents would be trying to learn a general form representation. Finally, we note that a fixed point of the T-map defines not just an equilibrium, but also a representation of that equilibrium. Once the T-map is obtained, the stability under learning of a particular representation can be addressed as follows. Let the equilibrium representation be characterized by the fixed point Θ * , and consider the differential equation
Notice that Θ * is a rest point of this ordinary differential equation. The representation corresponding to the fixed point is said to be E-stable if it is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of (16). The E-stability principle tells us that E-stable representations are locally learnable for Least Squares and closely related algorithms. That is, if Θ is E-stable. The intuition behind this principle is that a reasonable learning algorithm, such as least squares, would gradually adjust estimates Θ t in the direction of the actual parameters T (Θ t ) that are generating the data. For an E-stable fixed point Θ * such a procedure would then be expected to converge locally.
The above discussion has implicitly assumed a rest point Θ * that is locally isolated. In this case it is locally asymptotically stable under (16) provided all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of T at Θ * have real parts less than one, and it is unstable if the Jacobian has at least one eigenvalue with real part greater than one. Because we are studying sunspot equilibria, the set of rest points of (16) may have unbounded continua as connected components. Along these components the T map will always be neutrally stable, and thus will have at least one eigenvalue equal to unity.
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In this case we say a sunspot equilibrium representation is E-stable if the Jacobian of the T -map has eigenvalues with real part less than one, apart from unit eigenvalues arising from the equilibrium connected components.
We consider separately the determinate and two indeterminate cases. 
The relevant Jacobians are given by
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of two matrices.
Order One Indeterminacy
We employ the same notation as above and consider common factor and general form representations separately. We consider common factor representations first because their form is quite similar to the representation of determinate equilibria.
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In each case we compute E * t y t + 1
for the assumed PLM, insert into (15) and solve for y t as a linear function of the explanatory variables contained in the PLM. We omit the details, which are straightforward, and simply write down the T-map and corresponding Jacobians. ).
The relevant Jacobians are given by (20)- (22) and
where I 2 (x) = x ⊕ x. General Form Representations: Agents are assumed to have the PLM (12). The corresponding T-map is given by equation (17) together with
The relevant Jacobians are given by ( 
Order Two Indeterminacy
The analysis is almost the same as for order one indeterminacy. Learning the CF-representation in the case of order two indeterminacy is affected only in that the sunspot is now a VAR so that the T-map in the d variable is amended to have the form
The associated Jacobian is
Analysis of learning the GF-representation in case of order two indeterminacy is the same as for order one indeterminacy.
Results
We studied stability of general form and common factor sunspots in five models, which differed only in the specification of the monetary policy rule, and the models are identified by the number of the corresponding policy rule as given by equations (3)-(7). The models were analyzed using three different calibrations of the parameters in the IS-AS curves, as due to (Woodford 1999) , (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) and (McCallum and Nelson 1999) ; the relevant parameter values are given in Table 1 below. For convenience in interpreting the numerical results below we note that 1/.157 6.3694 . Also, each policy rule was analyzed both with and without lagged inflation in the AS equation (or Phillips curve). With pure Calvo pricing, and thus no inflation inertia in the AS equation, the discount rate β was set equal to .99 following W, CGG, and MN . When lagged inflation was included γ was set equal to one half, and we set β = 1, thereby imposing that the sum of the coefficients on inflation equals one. Finally, for all policy rules, the exogenous noise terms were taken to have damping parameter equal to .9. For each calibration (and for γ = 1 and .5), a lattice over the square (0, 10) × (0, 10) in policy space (α π , α x ) was analyzed. For PR 4 we also computed results for several values of θ.
Some general results were found across all or most of the policy rules and calibrations investigated, and are therefore worth summarizing before presenting more specific results in detail. Throughout this section we will use "stable" to mean "stable under learning" as determined by E-stability.
1. In no case were General Form sunspot solutions stable. for all forms of the policy rule, but they are only stable for PR 3 and PR
4
. 6. Stable CF sunspots arise with γ = 0.5 as well as in the purely forward looking case γ = 1.
Policy Rule 1
As noted in Section 2, policy rule 1 has a natural variant, which we label PR
1
. We summarize the results for PR 1 and PR 1 in separate subsections below.
PR
1
For ease of exposition, we restate, at the beginning of each subsection, the specification of the relevant policy rule. PR 1 is given by
PR 1 with γ = 1 (i.e. no lagged inflation in the AS) has been analyzed by a number of authors, including (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001). Bullard and Mitra found that the region in policy space corresponding to E-stability is precisely the region corresponding to determinacy; this result was obtained analytically and is independent of calibration. were feasible. However, as discussed above, it is widely agreed that current values of inflation and GDP are not available to policymakers. We include results for this policy rule primarily because it serves as a useful benchmark. We find that the result of Bullard and Mitra is robust to the inclusion of inflation inertia in the Phillips curve: in all cases investigated, determinacy implies stability under learning. In addition, when the model is indeterminate no solutions are stable, including CF sunspot solutions. An example lattice is plotted in Figure 1 for the Woodford calibration with γ = 1. Here and in all figures containing lattice plots, each lattice point is marked with a symbol indicating properties of the associated steady state: lattice points associated with determinate steady states are marked with an '×'; lattice points associated with indeterminate steady states and for which common factor representations exist (i.e. there exist at least two real eigenvalues) are marked with a ' * ', and lattice points associated with indeterminate steady states for which no common factor representations exist (i.e. there exists at most one real eigenvalue) are marked with a '·'. Also, if there exists a stable representation associated with the steady state, the symbol marking the lattice point is circled. CF sunspots exist for all indeterminate cases, a finding that extends to the other calibrations with γ = 1. Figure 2 shows the regions of determinacy and indeterminacy pertaining to the CGG calibration with γ = .5. The main result that all CF and GF sunspots are unstable still holds, but the region of determinacy is altered and here it is no longer the case that CF sunspots always exist. The failure of CF sunspots to exist seems to depend principally on the inertial term in the Phillips curve. When γ is set equal to one, all indeterminate steady states support common factor sunspots. The MN calibration yields much the same picture as the CGG calibration. Note that the range of policy parameters displayed does not necessarily coincide with the 10 × 10 grid, and also varies across figures; this was done to emphasize features particular to given figures. Under our information assumptions, when policymakers use PR 1 they effectively have an information advantage relative to private agents. This is because policymakers are conditioning policy on contemporaneous endogenous variables, which are assumed not available to private agents when their forming expectations. This information asymmetry does not arise under PR 1 to which we now turn.
PR
This policy can be thought of as a contemporaneous rule that is feasible even if current values of the endogenous variables π t and x t are not known at time t. We continue to make the assumption that all t-dated exogenous variables and all lagged variables are observed prior to expectations formation. As discussed further in Section 3.3, below, we are also making the homogeneous expectations assumption that policymakers and private agents form expectations in the same way. In contrast to our PR . This implies that the REE, their representations, and the regions of determinacy, indeterminacy, and explosiveness will be precisely as they were under PR , though with a slightly different interpretation of the timing structure: they assume that expectations formed at t use only information available at time t − 1. Although this differs from our assumption that exogenous variables at time t are part of the information set, it can be verified that the E-stability conditions are identical for the two information assumptions. Bullard and Mitra show, analytically, that their results for PR 1 hold also for PR 1 . In particular, the regions of determinacy are the same for both policy rules, and, for each policy rule, a steady state is stable under learning if and only if it is determinate.
We obtain the same correspondence and find that it also extends to the stability of sunspot solutions. We have already noted that the regions of de-terminacy, indeterminacy, and explosiveness are the same for PR , with γ = 1, was also studied by Bullard and Mitra. Numerically, and using the Woodford calibration, they found that, unlike PR 1 , there were determinate cases for which the REE was not stable under learning. They concluded that policy rules dependent on lagged output gap and inflation may not be advisable because agents may fail to coordinate on the equilibrium even though it is unique. We find that this result is robust to the calibrations considered here and extends to the specification with inertial inflation in the Phillips curve. Figure 3 gives an example plot using the CGG calibration and with γ = .5. In this Figure, forecasts also enter into the policy rule. Because we are now relaxing the rational expectations assumption, one can in principle distinguish between the forecasts of the private sector, which enter the IS and AS curves, and the forecasts of the Central Bank, which enter policy rule PR 3 or PR 4 . We will instead adopt the simplest assumption for studying stability under learning, which is that the forecasts for the private sector and the Central Bank are identical. This can either be because private agents and the Central Bank use the same least squares learning scheme, or it could be because one group relies on the others' forecasts. In the latter case, for example, the Central Bank might be setting interest rates as a reaction to private sector forecasts, as in (Bernanke and Woodford 1997) or (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). The homogeneous expectations assumption was also adopted in (Bullard and Mitra 2002).
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Since we are searching for stable sunspot equilibria, the homogeneous expectations assumption appears to give the greatest likelihood for finding them.
We now turn to the results. For policy rule PR
3
, under the calibrations studied, all determinate steady states are stable and no explosive steady states are observed.
0
However, in contrast to PR 1 and PR
2
, policy rule PR 3 can exhibit stable sunspots, and the region of stability may include economically reasonable parameter values. This result corroborates and extends those of (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001), who showed the existence of stable noisy K-state Markov sunspots for this policy rule. We discuss the relationship of our results to theirs below.
For the W and CGG calibrations, and for both values of γ, stable common factor representations exist. For the CGG calibration the region of stability requires aggressive ("active") policy response to both the output gap and to inflation, i.e. α For this calibration stable CF sunspots appear for large regions of plausible policy parameters. For the Woodford calibration, the results are almost as dramatic for the case γ = 0.5, as can be seen in Figure 5 . Recall that when we set γ = 1 we also set β = 0.99 in line with W, CGG and MN, whereas for the case γ = 0.5 we set β = 1, as in (Fuhrer and Moore 1995). The existence of stable CF sunspots does not depend on the choice of β, but the precise region is sensitive to this choice for PR 3 : for β < 1 (and either value of γ) the region of stable CF sunspots includes regions of part of the passive policy region α π < 1. We now relate these results to those found elsewhere in the literature. (Bullard and Mitra 2002) studied this model with γ = 1, and showed that all determinate equilibria were stable under learning. Our findings indicate that this result extends to models that include lagged inflation in the AS curve. Bullard and Mitra also found that for indeterminate steady-states the MSV solution 2 2 may be stable, and pointed out that whether agents could learn sunspots in this case was an open question. Clearly the answer to this question is a resounding yes. In particular, common factor representations can be thought of as MSV representations together with serially correlated sunspots, and we have found that these sunspots may be stable.
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) studied this model, with γ = 1, and demonstrated that finite state "resonance frequency" sunspots exist and are stable for a region of the parameter space. These solutions take the form
where s t is a K × 1 vector representing a K-state Markov process with transition probabilities that satisfy particular conditions sometimes called "resonant frequency conditions." This result is consistent with and, in fact, suggestive of ours. 
In (Evans and McGough 2002b) we show that there is an intimate link between CF representations and finite-state sunspots in univariate models. For the current model with γ = 1 our solutions (14) , for i = 2, 3, i.e. equal to a critical eigenvalue, is the resonant frequency condition for CF solutions. Our PR 3 result can thus be thought of as a generalization of the Honkapohja-Mitra finding: we extend the economic model to the case γ < 1, in which the model has backward looking components, and we exhibit and study the more general representations taking the form of CF sunspot solutions.
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003d) studied optimal discretionary policy in the model (1)-(2), with γ = 1, and advise an interest rate designed specifically to offset any destabilizing forward looking behavior of agents. Their recommended interest rate rule takes the form
and α ≥ 0 parameterizes the weight placed by the policy maker on output relative to inflation volatility. Note that optimal policy requires a dependence onĝ preference to other interest rate policies, such as fundamentals based rules depending only onĝ t , which they show to be unstable under learning even though they are consistent with the REE corresponding to optimal discretionary policy.
The size of the stable determinacy region surrounding this policy depends on the structural parameters. We investigated this point by analyzing nine lattices over the square (0, 10)×(0, 10) in policy space (α (Figure 4 , region C) is the region that remains. However, quantitatively we find the following: first, for fixed λ, as φ gets smaller, the region of stable indeterminacy shifts up, replaced by stable determinacy, and the region of unstable indeterminacy appears unaffected; second, for fixed φ, as λ gets smaller, the region of stable indeterminacy shifts up slightly, replaced by stable determinacy, and again, the region of unstable indeterminacy appears unaffected.
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The existence of stable sunspots in part of the parameter space provides an important caveat to following the advice of (Evans and Honkapohja 2003d). Policy makers may think the economy is in a determinate and stable region of its parameter space and thus that agents will learn the intended equilibrium; however, if policy makers are wrong about the values of the key parameters λ and φ, agents may instead coordinate on an inferior sunspot equilibrium.
Stability and determinacy respect small continuous movements in parameter values, and thus for any particular calibration, the Evans-Honkapohja rule will work well locally. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003d) However, numerical results suggest that the margin for error available to policy makers when attempting to follow the Evans-Honkapohja rule, can depend critically on the structural parameters. As an extreme, but perhaps not implausible example, we obtained results for λ = 1, φ = 6.3694, and γ = 1. The value φ is the one used in the W calibration, and λ = 1 is within the range of estimates from the literature mentioned on p. 170, footnote 32, in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) . In Figure 6 we see that a triangle of stable determinacy exists, but it is bordered by unstable indeterminacy on the left, and, even more ominously, by stable indeterminacy on the right. We conclude that in some cases learnable sunspots abound in regions not far from those corresponding to optimal policy. Our findings also import a more general warning: simply following a Taylor rule with aggressive response to expected inflation is not necessarily stabilizing for the economy. This warning is emphasized for the parameter values used in Figure 6 . Note that even for α 
Policy Rule 4
PR 4 is given by
where θ > 0. This policy rule is of particular interest in part because it is the form of the rule specifically considered in part IV of (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) . Furthermore, the issue of inertia in policy rules, captured by θ > 0, has been discussed extensively in the literature. (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) use the value θ = 0.68 based on (quarterly) estimates from the pre-Volker period, but there is no agreement that this is an appropriate value. numerically, for γ = 1, and found that for the CGG calibration of λ and φ and with their estimated values of α x , α π and θ for the pre-Volker era, the sunspot solutions that we call general form representations were unstable under learning. We confirm this result and we find also that although CF-sunspot solutions do exist, they are not stable under learning. Figure 7 shows the results for the CGG calibration of λ and φ with θ = 0.68: in the 10 × 10 policy grid for (α x , α π ), there are no stable CF sunspots, while all determinate steady states are learnable. Furthermore, these results are robust both to the inclusion of lagged inflation in the AS curve, 0 < γ < 1, and to the magnitude of 0 < θ < 1. 
3
, we find that there are many cases in which stable CF sunspots exist, and the location of this region in policy space is very sensitive to the values of structural parameters assumed. Even with the CGG calibration for λ and φ and with θ = 0.68, there exist stable CF sunspots for sufficiently large values of α π . Furthermore, for other values of λ and φ we find that the possibility of stable CF sunspots needs to be taken seriously. For example, for the values φ = 1/.157 and λ = 1 examined earlier, stable CF sunspots exist for passive responses to output gap, and aggressive responses to inflation; further, as θ gets small, the response to inflation required for stability becomes reasonably valued: see Figure 8 in which we set θ = 0.1. A very similar figure is obtained in case γ = .5; in particular, the presence of inflation inertia in the AS curve does not preclude stable CF sunspots at reasonable parameter values.
Figure 8 Here
Because the region of stable indeterminacy depends on the structural parameters φ and λ, as well as the interest rate smoothing term θ, we again test the robustness of our results to alternative calibrations. We analyzed 27 lattices over the square (0, 10) × (0, 10) in policy space (α π , α x ) corresponding to all permutations of λ ∈ {.024, .3, 1}, φ ∈ {.164, 1, 1/.157}, and θ ∈ {.05, .5, .9}. For this exercise we set γ = 1. In general, there are two regions of indeterminacy: an unstable region along the vertical axis for α π < 1: see Figure 8 , Region B; and a triangular region of stable CF sunspots in the southeast corner: see Figure 8 , Region C; the remaining region corresponds to stable determinacy: see Figure 8 , Region A. We find that as φ and λ get smaller, and as θ gets larger, the region of stable indeterminacy shifts to the right, replaced by stable determinacy. The unstable region appears unaffected.
One conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that while stable sunspots do exist under PR 4 for sufficiently aggressive responses to expected inflation, the policy maker may hedge against the danger, which depends on the true values of λ and φ, by setting the smoothing term 0 < θ < 1 to be fairly high.
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Finally, it is of interest to examine the case of superinertial rules with θ > 1. To remain consistent with the superinertial rules already in the literature, we modify PR 4 so as to ensure that the coefficients on expected inflation and current output gap are positive:
We examined equilibria corresponding to a 10×10 lattice over (χ π , χ x ) policy space, and for θ = 1.1 and 2, and γ = 1 and .5. For the W, CGG, and MN calibrations, this rule performed well; for all permutations of θ and γ and over the entire benchmark lattice the corresponding steady states were stable and determinate. However, stable indeterminacy was found for the alternative calibration φ = 1/.157, and λ = 1: see Figure 9 . The existence of these stable sunspots is robust to the permutations of θ and γ. 
Discussion
Sunspot equilibria are stable under learning only for Taylor-type policy rules that depend on forecasts of future inflation, and only for certain solution representations that we call "common factor" representations. However, for is small. Given uncertainty about the true values for φ and λ, the possibility of stable sunspots appears to be of genuine concern, and the possibility, in the indeterminate case, of all solutions being unstable is equally troubling.
Stable CF sunspot solutions can arise even if there are backward looking components to inflation and even if there is inertia (interest rate smoothing) in the monetary policy rule. This possibility had not been previously recognized in the literature. Interest rate inertia does, however, increase the region of stable determinacy relative to the benchmark policy square.
In general, inertia, or backward looking behavior, might be expected to reduce the risk of indeterminacy (i.e. reduce the proportion of the benchmark parameter space corresponding to indeterminate steady states). While we have demonstrated that inertial components in the AS curve and policy rule do not overturn our main results, it is possible that inertia in the IS curve -specifically, a dependence on lagged output gap, justified, say, by habit formation -may have an important impact. Investigation of this issue will receive a high priority in our future research.
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Our study of interest rate inertia focussed on interest rate rule PR
4
. It would also be useful to investigate the influence on the regions of determinacy and stability of an interest rate smoothing term in rules PR 1 -PR
3
. We restricted attention to the specification of these rules without the inertial term for expedience. However our preliminary investigations indicate that while the location and relative size of the regions of determinacy and stability are altered somewhat, the presence of interest rate inertia in policy rules PR 1 -PR 3 does not, in general, change our central results. This is also an issue that we intend to investigate more thoroughly in future work. 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the question of whether macroeconomic fluctuations, taking the form of coordination on extraneous exogenous variables, are likely to emerge under adaptive learning when the economy is characterized by New Keynesian IS-AS equations and monetary policy follows a form of Taylor rule. Both purely forward-looking and hybrid, partly backwardlooking inflation equations were examined. We have emphasized that the possibility of "sunspot equilibria" that are stable under adaptive learning depends critically on the representation of the solution, i.e. on the econometric specification used by agents when they estimate and update their forecasting model. In many cases stationary sunspot equilibria can be represented either as "general form" VARs, driven by serially uncorrelated sunspots, or as "common factor" sunspot solutions, in which the extraneous sunspot variables are autoregressive processes with resonant frequency coefficients. Common factor sunspots generalize finite state Markov sunspots, which were an early focus in the sunspot literature and which have recently been shown to yield the possibility of stable sunspots in purely forward looking linear models. In the New Keynesian model, we find that common factor sunspots can indeed be stable under learning, in many cases, even though the general form solutions with serially uncorrelated sunspots are not.
In particular, Taylor-type interest rate rules that depend on forecasts of future inflation can generate stable common factor sunspot solutions, and this risk is particularly high when there are strong IS and AS effects. This possibility arises even if the AS equation includes backward looking components and the interest rate rule includes inertia. This result is deeply troubling since monetary policy is often viewed as forward looking. If the structural model and its key parameters are known, or can be estimated fairly precisely, then an appropriately designed forward looking policy can deliver a stable determinate equilibrium (indeed an optimal stable equilibrium) and the sunspot problem will not arise. However, for some structural parameters the margin of error is small and the impact of an error is great. In contrast, policy rules depending on forecasts of current output and inflation do not appear to be subject to these difficulties. 
